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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 These appeals from two orders of the district court in a 
contribution action involving the allocation of response costs under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (1983 & Supp. 
1994), present an interesting question of first impression in the 
courts of appeals concerning transporter liability under CERCLA § 
107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4).  The first order granted 
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs/cross-appellants, 
Tippins Inc. and International Mill Construction, Inc. ("IMC"),1 and 
                     
    1.    IMC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tippins Inc.  Refer-
ences to Tippins in this opinion include IMC. 
 
 
held the defendants/appellants, USX Corporation and Petroclean Inc., 
liable for CERCLA response costs arising from the remedial action 
instituted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA") and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management at 
the Four County Landfill ("Four County") in Rochester, Indiana.  The 
court found USX liable as an arranger and Petroclean liable as a 
transporter.  The second order allocated among Tippins, Petroclean, 
and USX all past and future response costs. 
 Appellants raise a number of issues.  We write solely on 
Tippins' argument that a transporter is liable even if it does not 
select the facility at which the waste was disposed, and on Petro-
clean's argument that it cannot be held liable as a transporter 
unless the court finds that it made the ultimate decision to select 
Four County as the disposal facility.  We find no error in the 
district court's treatment of any of the other issues (described 
infra at pp. 6-8), and as they are straightforward they will be 
affirmed without discussion. 
 We reject Tippins' argument that under section 107(a)(4) a 
transporter is liable as a responsible party even if it does not 
"select" the disposal "facility" (in contrast to a "site").  We also 
reject Petroclean's assertion that it cannot be liable unless the 
court finds that it made the ultimate selection of the facility as 
the disposal location regardless of whether it contributed to the 
selection of the facility ultimately utilized.  We basically agree 
with Tippins that § 107(a)(4) applies if the transporter's advice 
was a substantial contributing factor in the decision to dispose of 
 
 
the hazardous waste at a particular facility.  As we interpret that 
section, a transporter selects the disposal facility when it 
actively and substantially participates in the decision-making 
process which ultimately identifies a facility for disposal.  Since 
there is no dispute that Petroclean did so -- Petroclean had 
considerable input into the selection process and, importantly, 
Tippins relied upon Petroclean's expertise in hazardous waste 
management when making its disposal decision -- Petroclean is liable 
as a transporter.  Accordingly, we will also affirm the grant of 
summary judgment against Petroclean on transporter liability. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In September 1987, Tippins signed an agreement with Sydney 
Steel Corporation of Nova Scotia to provide equipment for electric 
arc furnace ("EAF") steelmaking.  Included in this agreement was a 
provision that required Tippins to furnish and install an EAF 
baghouse.2  Tippins thereupon contacted a representative of U.S. 
Realty Development, a division of USX, and inquired about the 
availability of a baghouse.  In October 1987, a purchase agreement 
was executed whereby USX agreed to sell, and Tippins agreed to 
purchase, a used EAF baghouse which was located at the USX Duquesne 
Works for $300,000.  Under the purchase agreement, Tippins was 
responsible for the dismantling and load-out of the baghouse. 
                     
    2.    EAF dust is a byproduct of the manufacture of steel using 
electric furnaces.  A baghouse, a large, fabricated structure, 
vaccuums contaminated air inside to filter out the EAF dust.  The 
dust is collected inside a hopper or dumpster, and clean air is 
exhausted from the structure.  The EPA listed EAF dust as a hazard-
 
 
 As a result of USX's manufacturing and processing of steel 
at the Duquesne Works, EAF dust was present in and around the 
baghouse.  To effect cleanup of the EAF dust, Tippins solicited bids 
from contractors to pick up and transport the dust for disposal.  
Tippins eventually contracted with Petroclean, which is licensed to 
haul hazardous waste and specializes in the transport and disposal 
of hazardous substances, to transport the dust for disposal.  The 
transportation agreement provided that Petroclean would supply the 
labor, equipment, and material for removal and transport of the EAF 
dust as well as obtain a provisional EPA identification number for 
the generation of the hazardous waste. 
 The CECOS International facility in Williamsburg, Ohio was 
chosen after Petroclean gathered information on the site and 
submitted a proposal to Tippins based on certain cost parameters.  
Those cost parameters involved the use of a certain type of 
container for the dust known as a bulk lift disposal bag.  The 
parties subsequently learned that the CECOS site would accept EAF 
dust only if packaged in its own containers.  Since those containers 
were "prohibitively" expensive, Tippins and Petroclean agreed to 
transport the dust to another disposal site.  Petroclean, having 
surveyed substitute disposal sites, identified two landfills that 
would accept the dust, the Four County Landfill in Rochester, 
Indiana and Wayne Disposal, Inc. in Detroit, Michigan.  Petroclean 
contacted each site, gathered financial information as to disposal 
(..continued) 




costs, and offered Tippins both sites as possible disposal locations 
from which Tippins could choose.  Tippins subsequently picked Four 
County, where Petroclean disposed of the EAF dust.3 
 Later, both the EPA and the Indiana Department of 
Environmental Management requested the owner of Four County to 
participate in a program to monitor and close the landfill.  The EPA 
thereafter notified Tippins that it was a potentially responsible 
party for environmental contamination at Four County.  Tippins then 
made written demands upon Petroclean and USX, advising them of their 
potential liability under CERCLA for remedial investigation and 
response costs incurred by Tippins arising from the monitoring and 
closing of the landfill.  Petroclean and USX denied CERCLA liabili-
ty. 
 In August 1992, Tippins filed an action in the District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Petroclean 
and USX pursuant to CERCLA §§ 107(a) and 113(f), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
9607(a), 9613(f), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 
2201 (1994), seeking indemnity and contribution for past response 
costs and a declaratory judgment apportioning future response costs 
arising from the remedial action at Four County.  Tippins alleged 
                     
    3.    Petroclean subcontracted with another transporter, Dart 
Trucking Company, Inc., to transport at least a portion of the dust 
to Four County.  This contractual arrangement might have rendered 
Petroclean liable as an arranger under § 107(a)(3).  See, e.g., New 
York v. SCA Servs., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 926, 928-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  
The issue of Petroclean's liability as an arranger under § 107(a)(3) 
is not before us, however, because Tippins moved for summary judg-
ment under § 107(a)(4) and the district court found Petroclean 
liable as a transporter. 
 
 
that USX had arranged by contract for the disposal of the EAF dust 
and was liable as an arranger under § 107(a)(3) of CERCLA.  Tippins 
also alleged that Petroclean was liable as a transporter under § 
107(a)(4). 
 On cross-motions for summary judgment by Tippins and USX, 
the district court granted Tippins' motion, but denied that of USX.  
The court determined that USX was liable as an arranger under § 
107(a)(3), rejecting USX's claim that the purchase agreement with 
respect to the EAF dust was for the sale of a useful commodity in 
contrast to a contract arranging for the disposal of a hazardous 
substance.  The court also declined to find that Tippins was 
contractually bound to assume all potential CERCLA liability arising 
from the disposal of the dust by virtue of an indemnification clause 
in the purchase agreement.  As for Petroclean, the court summarily 
concluded that it was liable as a transporter under § 107(a)(4).  In 
a footnote, the court stated that, "[d]espite defendant Petroclean's 
attempt to characterize itself as merely the transporter who did not 
select the site . . ., it is a responsible party under CERCLA, as 
one who caused or contributed to a release or threatened release of 
hazardous waste."  Mem. Op. at 11 n.5 (May 25, 1993) (quotations and 
citations omitted).  The district court subsequently entered an 
order on October 19, 1993 allocating among the parties the past and 
future response costs associated with the remedial action at Four 




 Every party filed a timely notice of appeal raising the 
same issues that were before the district court.  The district court 
exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 
(1993), as the cause of action arose under CERCLA.  We have appel-
late jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (1993).  Our scope 
of review of summary judgment rulings is plenary.  Black v. Indiana 
Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 709 (3d Cir. 1993).  Summary judgment 
should be granted under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affida-
vits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law."  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).  As noted above, 
we think the other grounds for appeal lack merit, but will discuss 
the scope of transporter liability under § 107(a)(4).4 
                     
    4.    We do note that our rejection of the indemnity claim is 
informed by our decision in Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead Corp., No. 93-
3372, 1994 WL ________ (3d Cir. Aug. ??, 1994), filed this day.  In 
Beazer East, we hold that the question whether an indemnification 
clause shifts CERCLA liability is one of state law.  See id., 1994 
WL _____, at *__.  Under any conflicts of law analysis the governing 
law here is that of Pennsylvania, as the question is one of the 
interpretation of a purchase agreement for real property located in 
Pennsylvania, the purchase agreement was entered into in Pennsylva-
nia, and two of the three parties are residents of Pennsylvania.  
See, e.g., REST.2D CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 222, 224(2) (1971). 
 Under Pennsylvania law, while a party may contract for 
indemnification for its own torts, "the language in the indemnity 
provision must be clear and unequivocal, and the burden of proof 
falls on the party seeking such relief; the burden is even greater 
where such party drafted the agreement."  DiPietro v. City of 
Philadelphia, 496 A.2d 407, 410 (Pa. Super. 1985).  Here neither the 
hold harmless clause contained in USX's sales agreement, nor the 




II.  DISCUSSION 
 Congress enacted CERCLA to facilitate the cleanup of 
potentially dangerous hazardous waste sites, with a view to the 
preservation of the environment and human health.  CERCLA, a strict 
liability statute, has its "bite" in holding responsible parties 
financially accountable for the costs associated with a remedial or 
removal action at hazardous waste facilities.  See United States v. 
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1992).  Section 
107(a)(4)(B) provides that a responsible party, as defined in 
subsections 107(a)(1)-(4), shall be liable for "any other necessary 
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the 
national contingency plan."  Section 113(f)(1), as amended by the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. 
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (Oct. 17, 1986), provides for an 
express right of contribution "from any other person who is liable 
or potentially liable" under § 107(a).  To succeed under either 
section, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant is a 
responsible party.  See Lansford-Coaldale Water Auth. v. Tonolli 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993).  One basis for establishing 
a party's responsibility is transporter liability. 
(..continued) 
to, clearly and unequivocably encompass liability for USX's pre-
transfer torts, under CERCLA or otherwise. 
 
 
 Petroclean contends that the district court erred when it 
concluded that Petroclean was liable as a transporter under § 
107(a)(4),5 which provides that 
 §§any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment 
facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such 
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened 
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of 
a hazardous substance, shall be liable . . . . 
Specifically, Petroclean asserts that it cannot be liable unless the 
court finds that Petroclean made the ultimate selection of Four 
County as the disposal location.  Petroclean further submits that 
the record is "vague at best" regarding its role in site selection, 
and thus that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to this 
issue. 
 In response, Tippins argues that § 107(a)(4) does not 
mandate that a transporter make the ultimate decision to select the 
disposal facility.  Tippins claims that the phrase "selected by such 
person" found in § 107(a)(4) only modifies the term "sites," but not 
"facilities."  Since Four County is a "facility,"6 under Tippins' 
construction, Petroclean need not have participated in the selection 
of Four County as the disposal location at all for CERCLA liability 
to attach; its act of transportation would, standing alone, 
                     
    5.    CERCLA states that "[t]he terms `transport' or `transpor-
tation' means the movement of a hazardous substance by any mode 
. . . ."  42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(26). 
    6.    The parties agree that Four County is a "facility" as that 
term is defined in § 101(9). 
 
 
suffice.7  Tippins alternatively contends that, even if liability 
attaches only to transporters who "select" a facility, the record 
demonstrates that, as a matter of fact, Petroclean did select the 
Four County facility. 
 
                     
    7.    This is apparently a controversy of first impression in 
the courts of appeals.  The Ninth Circuit has declared that a 
plaintiff states a claim under § 107(a) for recovery of response 
costs against a transporter where the complaint contains allegations 
that the property subject to the cleanup is a "facility" and that 
the defendant-transporter "`selected' the property for disposal."  
Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1153 (1989).  
Since the parties did not dispute that issue, however, the court 
provided no reasoning for its construction of § 107(a)(4). 
 
 
A.  Application of the Phrase "Selected by Such Person" 
 It is axiomatic that the starting point for interpreting a 
statute is the language of the statute itself.  See Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S. Ct. 
2051, 2056, 64 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1980).  Thus, to determine whether the 
phrase "selected by such person" just modifies "sites," or also 
applies to "facilities," we turn to the language of § 107(a)(4), 
quoted supra at Error! Bookmark not defined..  Under any parsing of 
the statute, a person who transports a hazardous substance to a 
"site" is liable under § 107(a)(4) only if it selected that disposal 
location.  But there abides within an ambiguity as to whether 
selection is a necessary prerequisite to transporter liability where 
the hazardous waste is deposited at a "facility."  Namely, in view 
of the absence of a comma after "sites," the phrase "selected by 
such person" can be interpreted to modify only "sites," as opposed 
to also modifying "facilities" and "incineration vessels."  The fact 
that two divergent interpretations of § 107(a)(4) are plausible 
underscores the oft repeated notion that "CERCLA is not a paradigm 
of clarity or precision," Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New 
Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988), but "is riddled 
with inconsistencies and redundancies," Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d at 
258 n.5 (citation omitted). 
 A general canon of statutory construction holds that, 
absent a clear intention to the contrary, a modifier's reference is 
to the closest noun.  See NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 47.33 (4th ed. 1985) (stating that "referential and qualifying 
 
 
words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely 
to the last antecedent").  Because of the inartful crafting of 
CERCLA in general, however, reliance solely upon general canons of 
statutory construction must be more tempered than usual; such canons 
are more appropriately applied to divine intent from statutes 
carefully worded and assiduously compiled than from the imprecise 
statutory language such as that found in § 107(a)(4).  We believe 
that, notwithstanding the canon, the phrase "selected by such 
person" can, as the statute is grammatically constructed, also be 
construed to refer to "facilities" and "incineration vessels."  A 
number of district courts have adopted such a construction, along 
with several commentators.  See United States v. Petersen Sand & 
Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Alcatel 
Info. Sys. v. Arizona, 778 F. Supp. 1092, 1095-96 (D. Ariz. 1991); 
United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1416, 
1419-20 (W.D. Wash. 1991); United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 
1444, 1458 (W.D. Okl. 1990); United States v. South Carolina Recy-
cling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1005 (D.S.C. 1984), 
judgment modified on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Monsan-
to Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 
109 S. Ct. 3156, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1989); SUSAN M. COOKE, THE LAW OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE § 14.01[4][e], at 14-139 (1987); 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, 
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES § 8.12[D], at 680-82 
(1992); DONALD W. STEVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION & HAZARDOUS WASTE § 
607[2][f][iii], at 6-164 (1989); cf. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & 
Co., 836 F. Supp. 1264, 1272-73 (W.D. La. 1993) (informing 
 
 
construction of an analogous provision under the Louisiana Environ-
mental Quality Act by reference to Western Processing). 
 The distinction Tippins advances would be illusory at best 
and nonsensical at worst, as CERCLA broadly defines "facility" to 
include any "site" containing a hazardous substance.  See 42 
U.S.C.A. § 9601(9).8  Thus, Tippins' reading would lead to a curious 
result.  On the one hand, a transporter would be liable if it 
transported the waste to a virgin site (one containing no hazardous 
substances) only if it selected that site.  On the other hand, a 
transporter would be liable if it transported the waste to a site 
containing hazardous substances (thereby a "facility") whether or 
not it selected that location.  The oddness of this result is 
aggravated by the fact that the very first shipment to a virgin site 
would deflower it, and the transporter would be liable for any 
subsequent shipments even if it had not selected that site.  Tippins 
has advanced no reason why Congress might have intended such a 
peculiar result.  As we read CERCLA, the terms site and facility 
substantially overlap -- they may even be equivalent, an issue we 
                     
    8.    CERCLA defines "facility" as: 
 
 (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe 
or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly 
owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impound-
ment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, 
rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where 
a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed 
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does 
not include any consumer product in consumer use or any 
vessel. 
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9). 
 
 
need not decide -- and therefore "there can be little sense in 
holding the transporter liable for deliveries made to facilities 
designated by others, but holding him liable for deliveries to 
`sites' only if the transporter chose the site."  Western Process-
ing, 756 F. Supp. at 1420.   
 We conclude then that a transporter must select the 
disposal facility to be held liable under § 107(a)(4).  This 
conclusion is based on our finding that the subordinate clause 
"selected by such person" modifies the referents "facilities" and 
"incineration vessels" along with the referent "sites."  We must now 
consider what acts by a transporter constitute selection of the 
disposal facility.   
 
B.  The Meaning of "Selection" 
 Since a transporter must select the disposal location to 
be liable under § 107(a)(4), we must determine whether Petroclean 
selected Four County as the disposal facility.  Tippins argues that 
Petroclean selected the site because it was actively involved in the 
selection process.  Not surprisingly, Petroclean counters this 
contention and would construe § 107(a)(4) narrowly to hold a 
transporter liable only when it made the final decision to select 
the disposal facility.  CERCLA does not unequivocally resolve the 
question of what particular acts by a transporter constitute 
selection, as it does not define the term "select."  Nor did the 




 Apparently no court of appeals has yet considered this 
issue, but at least one district court has.  In United States v. 
Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1444 (W.D. Okla. 1990), the United States 
claimed that United States Pollution Control, Inc. ("USPCI") was 
liable as a transporter under § 107(a)(4).  In support of its 
argument, the government asserted that liability attaches when a 
transporter actively participates or assists in the site selection.  
USPCI urged the court to reject the government's argument and to 
hold that a transporter can be liable only if it acted alone in 
selecting the disposal site.  The district court declined the 
invitation to "define the outer limits of transporter liability."  
Id. at 1459.  The court, instead, held that under the circumstances 
presented in that case, the government had clearly met its burden of 
proof under § 107(a): 
 Here, USPCI[] contracted with Mr. Hardage to use the 
Hardage Site for hazardous waste disposal prior to 
approaching any of the customers in question; proposed the 
Hardage Site to its customers as a location for hazardous 
waste disposal; determined whether certain customers' 
waste would be sent to injection wells as opposed to the 
Hardage Site; sent hazardous waste to the Hardage Site 
without the knowledge of, or instructions from, certain 
customers; and represented itself to at least one customer 
as the owner/operator of the Hardage Site.  Finally, 
members of USPCI's senior management admitted under oath 
that USPCI did indeed select the Hardage Site for disposal 
of hazardous wastes on certain occasions. 
Id. 
 The facts in Hardage are stronger for imposition of 
liability than those at bar.  This distinction turns out to be one 
without a difference, though, for we believe that a person is liable 
as a transporter not only if it ultimately selects the disposal 
 
 
facility, but also when it actively participates in the disposal 
decision to the extent of having had substantial input into which 
facility was ultimately chosen.9  The substantiality of the input 
will be a function, in part, of whether the decisionmaker relied 
upon the transporter's special expertise in reaching its final 
decision.  In other words, the selection process is a continuum and, 
in the circumstances we have described, the selection is done 
jointly. 
 Construing the term "selected" to encompass those persons 
whose participation in the selection process is as described takes 
no liberties with the statute.  In Justice Holmes' oft quoted words, 
"[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the 
skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."  
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S. Ct. 158, 159, 62 L. Ed. 2d 
372 (1918).  In a case such as this, where the statute does not 
define the term at issue and the legislative history is unavailing, 
we must define the term "selected" in light of its ordinary use and 
the overall policies and objectives of CERCLA. 
 First, we note that our construction of "selected" is 
within the term's ordinary meaning.  To "select" is "to choose from 
                     
    9.    Two district courts appear to have adopted this standard.  
See Western Processing, 756 F. Supp. at 1420 ("As one who actively 
selected a disposal site, the transporter may more equitably be 
subject to liability."); South Carolina Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 
1006 (holding a company liable as a transporter under § 107(a)(4) 
where it "participated in the selection of [the facility].").  
Neither court provided any rationale for its construction. 
 
 
a number or group usu[ally] by fitness, excellence, or other 
distinguishing feature."  WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2058 
(Philip B. Gove ed. 1966).  When a transporter with a knowledge and 
understanding of the industry superior to its customer's 
investigates a number of potential disposal sites and suggests 
several to the customer from which it may pick, and the customer 
relies upon the transporter's knowledge and experience by choosing 
one of the winnowed sites, the transporter has performed a 
selection.  Although the transporter has not made the ultimate 
decision, it has made the penultimate one; for all intents and 
purposes, the transporter has selected the facility by presenting it 
as one of a few disposal alternatives.  In such cases of 
cooperation, the customer and transporter have jointly selected an 
appropriate disposal facility. 
 The "active participation" standard advances the 
objectives of CERCLA by recognizing the reality that transporters 
often play an influential role in the decision to dispose waste at a 
given facility.  Generators undoubtedly regularly rely upon a 
transporter's expertise in hazardous waste management when 
considering disposal alternatives.  A sophisticated transporter 
specializing in the transportion of hazardous material is 
accordingly frequently in the best position to ensure safe and 
proper disposal of the waste.  There is no sound reason for such 
parties to escape CERCLA liability while the generators, owners, and 
operators are held liable, when they essentially determined the 
disposal location subjected to the remedial actions and incurring 
 
 
the response costs.  This approach also comports with the need to 
interpret a remedial statute such as CERCLA liberally.  See Alcan 
Aluminum, 964 F.2d at 258.   
 We emphasize that for liability to attach, a transporter 
must be so involved in the selection process that it has substantial 
input into the disposal decision.  A transporter clearly does not 
select the disposal site merely by following the directions of the 
party with which it contracts.  See supra Part II.A.  In such cases, 
the transporter is no more than a conduit of the waste and its 
"connection with the material is the most attenuated among poten-
tially responsible parties."  Western Processing, 756 F. Supp. at 
1420.  Congress intended such transporters to avoid liability.  To 
be held liable under § 107(a)(4), the transporter must be so engaged 
in the selection process that holding it liable furthers one of 
CERCLA's central objectives:  to hold all persons actively involved 
in the storage or disposal of hazardous waste financially 
accountable for the cost of remedying resulting harm to the human 




C.  Petroclean's Putative Selection of the Four County Landfill 
 Applying this standard to the instant case, we conclude 
that the district court appropriately granted summary judgment 
against Petroclean since there is no genuine issue of material fact 
as to Petroclean's active participation in the decision to dispose 
of the EAF dust at Four County.  Petroclean admits that it did more 
than merely pick up the dust and transport it to the landfill.  As a 
company specializing in site remediation and hazardous waste and 
transportation services, Petroclean had substantial input into the 
selection process, and Tippins clearly relied on its special 
expertise in ultimately choosing Four County. 
 Petroclean first identified the CECOS facility as the 
disposal site for the EAF dust, and subsequently contracted with 
Tippins to dispose of the waste there.  Later, after discussions 
with CECOS about disposal costs, Petroclean learned that CECOS 
accepted waste only if packaged in special disposal bags which 
Petroclean considered "prohibitively" expensive.  Petroclean 
thereafter surveyed alternative landfills, and completed 
applications for two possible disposal locations, Wayne Disposal and 
Four County.  After receiving estimated disposal costs for the EAF 
dust from those sites, Petroclean forwarded the financial 
information to Tippins, which relied upon it to make its final 
selection of Four County as the disposal facility.10 
                     
    10.    Tippins also relied on Petroclean to complete the neces-
sary forms for Tippins to receive an EPA waste identification 
number, to contact the State of Indiana and EPA Region 5 concerning 




 Although Petroclean did not make the final decision to 
dispose of the dust at Four County, it substantially contributed to 
and shared in that decision by locating and submitting a limited 
number of potential disposal sites from which Tippins could select.  
Moreover, it is evident from the record that Tippins at all times 
relied upon Petroclean's expertise in the field of hazardous waste 
management when deciding the appropriate means and location to 
dispose of the EAF dust.  On these facts, Petroclean was far more 
than a mere conduit of the hazardous waste; rather, it actively 
participated in the site selection decision, such that Petroclean 
and Tippins, working together, selected Four County as the disposal 
site.  Consequently, Petroclean is liable under CERCLA § 107(a)(4) 
as a transporter which selected the disposal facility. 
 
 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
  
